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1
Assessing the voting power of a decision maker depends on the appropriate evaluation of all factors
influencing such power. Models constructed with the use of a set of given factors are usually statistically
significant, but at the same time the determination coefficient is very low. An econometric technique is
proposed, which increases the determination coefficient of such a model and consequently improves the
estimation of voting power using a power index. Such an approach enables us to investigate the nature of
hidden factors by considering their effects and variation in the model. An example and algorithm for
improving the econometric model are also presented.
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Assumptions used in the research:
an example of econometric assessment
In the book of Gladysz and Mercik [5], one may find an example of modeling the
voting frequency in the Polish presidential election of 2000. The econometric model
obtained is:
Frequency = 0.6597 – 0.1349 unemployment rate
+ 0.4832 number of firms registered
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It is statistically significant, but has a relatively low determination coefficient:
20 98 . 8 ; 3009 . 0
2 − = − = E value p R . Therefore, there is a hidden factor (or factors)
which influences the frequency, but which remains unknown (hidden) to researchers.
Moreover, the modeling of election results and any calculation of power indices must
be influenced by this hidden factor, too.
Following this idea, one can also formulate the hypothesis that the power of a de-
cision making body as a whole and, in general, the power of each individual decision
maker may depend not only on the structure of a decision making body and the distri-
bution of votes, but also on something which may be called a hidden factor. This, at
least in practice, is agreed upon by political scientists.
Index of power
Let s assume the following:
N = {1, ..., n} denotes a set of players (these may be, e.g., individuals or parties),
i ϖ (i = 1, ..., n) denotes the (real, non-negative) weight of the i-th player such that
0     1,   = ≥ ∑
∈
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    , γ denotes a quota, γ is a real number,  1 0 ≤ <γ .




is called a committee of size n.
For any non-empty subset S ⊆ N and a given allocation ω and quota γ, we say that
S ⊆ N is a winning coalition
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By definition, a power index is a vector valued function
E G       :   → π ,
where πi(γ, ω) is the share of power that the index π grants to the i-th member of
a committee.
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The most commonly used definitions of such an index of power are:
• the Shapley–Shubik index of power [13],
• the Penrose–Banzhaf (absolute and relative) index of power [10], [1].
Both indices are an a priori measure of the power of individuals (decision makers)
in relation to the formation of a coalition (Shapley–Shubik) or in terms of his/her
power to break up a winning coalition (Penrose–Banzhaf) – players may be consid-
ered to be in a swing or pivotal position, respectively.
Constrained indices of power
A crucial assumption for any a priori index of power is connected with the likeli-
hood  (possibility) of a given coalition. It is assumed that any possible coalition can
exist. Therefore, the power index for coalitions which are very unlikely is calculated
in the same way as for coalitions which are highly likely.
The assumption about the equal likelihood of all coalitions may be contested from
different points of view. For example, Rikker [11] postulates that only a minimal size
(in the sense of the number of participants) coalition will be realized. Owen [9] intro-
duced so called pre-coalitions, i.e., he defined a structural net of coalitions describing
which coalitions are possible and which are not. Mercik and Mazurkiewicz [7], [8]
defined the likelihood of a given coalition based on the ideological distance between
members of this coalition
3, which to some extent may be seen as the beginning of
estimation of the effect of hidden factors.
It is obvious that rejection of the assumption of the equal likelihood of coalitions
changes the values of power indices. However, the question of whether an index of
power reflects the share of power among committee members seems to have been
solved already
4 – it is a common tacit supposition that a power index measures power,
however only the absolute Banzhaf power index may be directly used as a measure of
the power of a committee member
5.
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Any power index which assumes that coalitions are not equally likely is called
a constrained power index and denoted by  ) , ( ϖ γ π
C
i .
Hidden factors of power
The voting power index,  ) , ( ϖ γ πi  (or constrained voting power index  ) , ( ϖ γ π
C
i )
is an a priori power index and only reflects the structure of a committee. In fact, in
1953 Lloyd Shapley used his index of power as a pay-off function in a co-operative
game and only later, when the theory of 0–1 (characteristic function) games was de-
veloped, did it become transformed into the Shapley–Shubik [13] power index. This
a priori approach may lead to some problems in the interpretation of power indices.
For example, the following two committees of 3 voters with 100 votes and a 51%
majority rule: (51; 33; 34; 33) and (51; 49; 49; 2), have the same Shapley–Shubik
power indices: (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). It is very hard to believe that the realization of a pay-off
function for a governmental coalition (distribution of ministers, for example) will be
the same for these two committees.
In the case of the three member committee (51; 49; 49; 2) one would rather expect
a power index of the form  ) 3 / 1    , 3 / 1    , 3 / 1 ( γ ε γ ε − − + +  with appropriate values for
ε, γ than (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Hence, we consider the following equation:
i i
R
i H + = ) , ( ) , ( ϖ γ π ϖ γ π ,
where: R stands for “realistic”,  ) , ( ϖ γ πi describes the index of power of the i-th player
with a quota γ and committee of size n with structure given by ϖ  and Hi stands for
a hidden factor, which increases or decreases the power of the i-th player.
Of course, the hidden factor may be modeled analogically to an econometric model as
i
k
i i i a a f H ε + = ) ..., , (
1  ,
where: εi is the error of estimation, resulting from unknown factors influencing po-
wer
6.
 We want to show that under certain assumptions Hi can be estimated for a given
committee by statistical methods.
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The following assumptions may be formulated regarding Hi for a given committee
structure, voting procedure and quota:
1)  for  0         0         1 1 1 = ⇒ > ⇒ = H n π ,
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We also assume that  i
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1  fulfills the standard Gauss-Markov as-
sumption, i.e.,
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where all the 
k
i i a a ..., ,
1  are known
9 and Hi is hidden.
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8 If not, in many cases by using simple transformations a model may be transformed into a linear one.
Also, non-linear models may be used, but in this case measures of correlation which do not assume
a linear relationship have to be used in the optimization problem considered.
9 In most cases, the factors influencing various parties are different. For example, farmers’ income
may be used as descriptive factor for a peasant party, workers’ income may be used for a socialist party,
GDP may be used as a factor for both parties. In reality such factors can be astonishingly different (see,
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+ + ..., ,
1  are also unknown or unmeasurable may also be
considered, but in this case additional information (like the concept of “direction of
influence” presented below) has to be used.
The estimation of a hidden factor
In general, the accuracy of the estimation of a hidden variable Hi depends on the
quality of the information gained. This information may consist of the following in-
formation (see Krefft [6]):
– ℜ a vector of signs of size (1 x k): (ℜ1, ℜ2, ..., ℜk), describing the direction of
influence of each a on the hidden variable Hi (when a sign is “+”, an increase in 
j
i a
tends to be accompanied by an increase in Hi; when a sign is “–“ an increase in 
j
i a
tends to be accompanied by a decrease in Hi),
– 
min max, i i H H  minimal and maximal values for Hi; constraints on Hi.
The estimation of 
min max, i i H H  is relatively easy: each Hi satisfies the following
inequality:
) , ( 1 ) , ( ω γ π ω γ π i i i H − ≤ ≤ − .
The derivation of ℜ needs more than mathematical assumptions. It must be ob-
tained by external analysis, but knowledge regarding the directions of influence is
a realistic assumption.
Using these assumptions, we may define the problem of estimating Hi as the fol-
lowing optimization problem (OP):
Find Hi such that
0 = ∑
i
i H  AND
{(max correlation between Hi and 
j
i a  if ℜi =”+”) OR (min correlation Hi and 
j
i a  if ℜi
=”–”)}, for  ) , ( 1 ) , ( ω γ π ω γ π i i i H − ≤ ≤ − .
Of course, in order to eliminate the overestimation of multi-impact on Hi the set of
k
i i a a ..., ,




i < ) , (  for  r j ≠ , where cor stands for correlation and
α r  for the critical value of correlation obtained from the t-Student distribution for
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The problem of non-unique solutions
Two aspects of the uniqueness of a solution of such an OP may be considered:
– the indirect influence of correlation, which results from a given level of signifi-
cance connected with the Student’s t distribution, as well as
– directly connected to the method of solving the OP.
In both cases, the uniqueness of the set of {Hi} is connected with the number k of
the descriptive variables used to estimate it, 
k
i i a a ..., ,
1 , for  2 >> k . It is probably
10
possible to find at least two different solutions when k = 2, but a greater number of
descriptive variables excludes the possibility of such a phenomenon. Moreover, the
idea of the algorithm is such that at the beginning a correlation of 1 is assumed and by
appropriately lowering this correlation the first solution is found. In practice, there is
no chance of finding a non-unique solution.
The additional indirect, for a given level of significance, influence of the t-Student
critical value on the uniqueness of the set of {Hi} is apparent. The significance level
is chosen and determined by the researcher and is constant for all calculations. How-
ever, a certain parameterization may be carried out as well, in order to establish the
stability of the solution. Once again, this does not produce non-unique solutions.
Example
Let us consider the situation in the Polish parliament. The a priori values of the
power (Shapley–Shubik) index are presented in table 1.
Let us assume for simplicity that there are only two factors influencing power:
namely factor A and factor B and that these agents are the same for all parties.
Hence,
ε α α α + + + = B A H
i i i
i 2 1 .
Let us assume that the observations of A and B are known (table 2). The data are
taken from Gładysz and Mercik (2004) and describe the rate of unemployment and the
voting frequency during the presidential election in a random sample based on 20 of
the 316 electoral districts. The correlation coefficient between A and B equals –0.442
and is not significant for α = 0.05 and df = 18. Therefore, A and B are not signifi-
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i
i H  was un-
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cantly correlated. Moreover, they satisfy the Gauss–Markov assumptions for econo-
metric models.
Table 1. The Shapley–Shubik power index for the lower chamber of the Polish parliament










PiS 155 36.67 35.71 21.43
PO 131 23.33 21.43 14.29
Sam 55 13.33 14.29 17.86
SLD 55 13.33 14.29 17.86
LPR 29 6.67 7.14 14.29
PSL 25 6.67 7.14 14.29
AKP 5 0 0 0
N/A 5 0 0 0
Table 2. Data for factors A and B, where ai and bi are their respective observations





















In order to estimate (for the PiS party in the case of the Shapley–Shubik power in-
dex) the value of H1, one has to carry out the following steps:
– define the possible range of H1:
• 6333 . 0 3667 . 0 ) , ( 1 ) , ( 1 1 1 1 + < ≤ − ⇒ − ≤ ≤ H H ω γ π ω γ π ,Econometric estimation of hidden factors ... 129
• find a solution of the OP: some of the calculations are presented in table 3,
where a macro written for the Excel package was used to generate (hidden) values
of H1,
• calculate the value of H1 for given values of ai and bi. In this example a1 and b1
are 0.746047316791691 and 0.541744093443058 respectively.
Table 3. The results of the calculations for the hidden Hi





















The same steps have to be carried out for the remaining Hi. It is crucial that the
condition  0 = ∑
i
i H  be satisfied. However, the estimated values of Hi do not satisfy
it! Once again, one can use the Excel macro with elements of annealing
11 to obtain
an optimal (or near-optimal solution). The result for this example is presented in
table 4.
Due to the choice of parameters (our goal was and not only to illustrate the meth-
odology of estimating the power of certain group members than to estimate the power
of parties represented in the lower chamber of the Polish parliament), the differences
obtained in the example are minimal. Moreover, in this case the obtained solution is
only near-optimal:  5757 0.00152026 = ∑
i
i H .
                                                     
11 Piotr Wawrzynowski, a PhD student from Wroclaw University of Technology, wrote the appropri-
ate program in VBA.
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1 PiS 36.67 –0.0594209 36.6105791
2 PO 23.33 1.0667074 24.3967074
3 Sam 13.33 –0.0909267 13.2390733
4 SLD 13.33 –0.2178984 13.1121016
5 LPR 6.67 –0.417085 6.252915
6 PSL 6.67 –0.1293497 6.5406503
7 AKP 0 7.13523E-11 7.13523E-11
8 N/A 0 4.86937E-12 4.86937E-12
Conclusions
Hidden factors exist which influence power indices. In each problem the set of
hidden factors is different and has to be determined by specialists (most likely politi-
cal scientists). The proposed method for deriving the influence of these factors is ef-
fective and gives corrected values of any power index (not just the Shapley-Shubik
index). It is expected that the corrected distribution of power is a better reflection of
the real distribution of power among decision-makers (voters) in a given decision-
making body.
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Estymacja ekonometryczna czynników ukrytych w decyzjach grupowych
– wpływ na estymację indeksu siły
Estymacja siły decydenta jest zależna od właściwej oceny wszystkich czynników na nią wpływają-
cych. Budowane zazwyczaj modele ekonometryczne są co prawda statystycznie istotne, jednak mają
relatywnie niską determinację. W artykule zaproponowano ekonometryczną technikę modelowania, słu-
żącą do podniesienia wartości współczynnika determinacji i w konsekwencji prowadzącą do poprawy
oceny siły decydenta. Takie podejście umożliwia także zbadanie charakterystyk różnych czynników
ukrytych dzięki obserwacji ich oddziaływania na zmienność modelu. W pracy pokazano także przykład
oraz algorytm takiego postępowania w podejściu do modelu ekonometrycznego.
Słowa kluczowe: zmienne ukryte, indeks siły